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Human-Scale Economics: Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction
in Northeastern Thailand
JOEL D. MOOREa and JOHN A. DONALDSONb,*
aMonash University Malaysia, Malaysia
bSingapore Management University, Singapore
Summary. — Under what conditions does economic growth beneﬁt the poor? One way to answer this question is to identify and com-
pare positive and negative outlier areas, those that experience greater and lesser poverty reduction, respectively, compared to what was
anticipated given their levels of economic growth. The more similar these areas, the more leverage there is to unearth the factors that
allow the poor to beneﬁt from growth. In this paper, we employ an inductive approach to glean possible pathways out of poverty from
two highly similar underdeveloped neighboring provinces in northeastern Thailand. Using extensive ﬁeldwork and interviews, we explore
factors that can account for one province reducing poverty at a quicker pace than expected, even as the other failed to channel its faster
growth into signiﬁcant poverty reduction. Our study ﬁnds that in Surin province, because a strong network of local NGOs was working
closely with provincial leadership, national policies that targeted the poor found fertile ground and thrived. Small-scale, low-tech, rural-
based initiatives including organic rice, handicraft production, and rural tourism helped drive initially high levels of poverty down.
Though many in Si-Saket also pursued many of these initiatives, they were structured in ways that promoted economic growth but lar-
gely prevented poor farmers from beneﬁtting. Further research can examine whether this kind of ‘‘micro-oriented” path to rapid rural
poverty reduction is useful in other contexts.
 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Under what conditions does economic growth beneﬁt the
poor? Most development experts, economists, and policy mak-
ers agree that expanding the value of goods and services in any
economy—that is, economic growth—has the potential to
reduce poverty (Kanbur, 2001). This consensus breaks down,
however, at the question of how consistent the connection
between economic growth and poverty reduction actually is,
and which kinds of economic activities reduce poverty most
eﬀectively. A number of economists (e.g., Bhagwati, 1985;
Dollar & Kraay, 2002; Lal & Myint, 1996; Spence, 2008) have
argued that economic growth measured through GDP can be
generally assumed to beneﬁt the poor through mechanisms
such as trickling down from rich to poor or radiating out spa-
tially from growth poles. As long as economic output expands,
they say, members of all income bands will generally beneﬁt.
This argument has received substantial criticism on both
methodological and theoretical grounds (e.g., Eastwood &
Lipton, 2000; Rodrik, 2000; Weisbrot, Baker, Naiman, &
Neta, 2000).
In addition to directly criticizing the purported relationship
between economic growth and poverty reduction, examining
exceptions to this relationship can also be fruitful. Examining
economies that yield dramatically more poverty reduction
than others despite their similar economic growth rates can
unearth new ideas—policies, economic activities or other types
of interventions—regarding how to make economic activity
better serve the poor. Still, the causes of poverty are legion
and interconnected—in addition to social forces, geography,
and demography, even the weather and natural climate can
play important roles.
How then do we sort out which variables lead to exceptional
poverty reduction? By comparing anomalous cases with other-
wise similar cases that experienced signiﬁcantly less poverty
reduction, we can inductively infer which factors caused the
divergence in outcomes. We adopt this approach in this paper.
Here, we employ a ‘‘most similar systems” research design
(Bennett & George, 2004; Lijphart, 1971) by comparing the
experiences of two neighboring provinces in northeastern
Thailand: Surin and Si-Saket. Studying them can inductively
produce testable expectations about which pathways can cre-
ate poverty reduction outside of economic growth. These
two provinces are similar across a number of factors, yet have
had sharply contrasting and unexpected records in reducing
poverty despite similar growth trajectories.
First, both of the selected provinces share the same overall
national policy framework. Thailand has a unitary govern-
ment, with policy directed by the center and administered
through a national bureaucracy (Mutebi, 2004). Despite
decentralization starting in the 1990s, provincial administra-
tion remains highly constrained; provincial oﬃcials are consid-
ered agents of the central government and are expected to
implement national policy faithfully. Such leaders enjoy a very
low degree of autonomy. Second, the two provinces neighbor
one another and share demographic, 1 geographic, 2 and envi-
ronmental features. Third, both started the period under
investigation with similar proportions of the population living
in poverty. Yet, in spite of these similarities, Surin saw rapid
poverty reduction despite a brisk but somewhat slower rate
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of growth, while Si-Saket experienced one of the lowest rates
of poverty reduction in the region, despite its somewhat more
rapid pace of economic development.
In order to understand this puzzling pattern, we adopted a
three-pronged research strategy. First, we reviewed relevant
statistics and the modest amount of research published so
far on these two provinces. Second, in Bangkok, we met with
academics and government oﬃcials to understand further cen-
tral policies, gather additional quantitative data not found
through electronic sources, and learn more about the central
approach to development in the Isan region. Finally, we spent
several months during two stints of research ﬁeldwork in Isan
in 2013 and 2015, interviewing academics, local government
oﬃcials, and NGO leaders and activists, as well as local farm-
ers and other rural residents. While the results are not deﬁni-
tive and await further testing, this process unearthed new
insights—hypotheses about ways to reduce rural poverty.
1. GROWTH & POVERTY IN SURIN AND SI-SAKET
Surin and Si-Saket are located in Isan, the northeast region
of Thailand that borders Cambodia. During 2000–10, Si-Saket
province experienced an average GPP per capita growth rate
of 13.4% per year (NESDB., n.d.-a) while its poverty rate
dropped only a modest amount, from 62.2% to 55.9%
(NESDB., n.d.-b). Meanwhile, the poverty rate in Surin pro-
vince fell a startling 56.3 percentage points, declining from
73.8% to 17.5% in the same period. (NESDB, n.d.-b) despite
Surin’s having a lower (though still heady) average annual
growth rate of 10.7% (NESDB, n.d.-a). This was despite Sur-
in’s higher initial poverty gap. 3 Figure 1 displays the divergent
poverty patterns experienced by the two provinces, despite
parallel growth trajectories. Here, we focus on Surin’s case
because of its astonishing success. Si-Saket, being the province
that experienced the greater disconnect between its rapid rate
of GDP growth and its modest degree of poverty reduction,
provides a comparison case.
In this paper, we argue that three factors were fundamental
to understanding Surin’s surprising pace of poverty reduction.
First, a strong network of activists in Surin helped to ensure
that national policies designed to help poor farmers and other
rural residents were implemented locally in such a way as to
achieve poverty reduction, rather than political patronage,
goals. Second, Surin’s proactive governor was especially sup-
portive of these policies. Third, at the national level the gov-
ernment both prioritized the rural poor for political reasons
and allowed for decentralized authority at the provincial gov-
ernor and tambon (sub-district) levels. Together, these allowed
local oﬃcials in some provinces to implement central-level
policies especially vigorously. The combined eﬀorts of policy
makers and civil society leaders led to poverty reduction by
ensuring that poor farmers and others could take advantage
of the growth generated by a number of small-scale productive
activities, including organic rice production, handicrafts
through the One Tambon One Product (OTOP) program,
and local rural-based tourism. These were structured in such
a way as to allow the participation of often poorly educated
low-income rural residents. Though these kinds of activities
tend to generate less economic output as measured by GDP,
our research suggests that a higher proportion of the income
derived from these initiatives wound up in the pocket of the
poor in ways that are described below. To be sure, initiatives
such as OTOP and organic rice were implemented in many
provinces. Why were they especially eﬀective in reducing pov-
erty in Surin but not elsewhere? As mentioned, it was the pro-
vince’s strong network of civil society and committed local
political leaders that ensured that these programs were struc-
tured in ways that reduced poverty. In Si-Saket, leaders also
pursued these same economic activities—but as we will show
below, their eﬀorts not only enjoyed less success but were
structured to concentrate the beneﬁts of growth in fewer and
wealthier hands. Without the support of Surin’s network of
embedded civil society, there were fewer mechanisms to spread
the beneﬁts of Si-Saket’s impressive growth rates to more of
the province’s poor, and hence Si-Saket’s record on poverty
was meager, especially when compared to Surin’s. See Figure 2
for a graphical statement of this argument.
In this paper, we detail this argument by ﬁrst reviewing the
potential pathways to poverty reduction that emerge from
research in a number of disciplines. Second, we set the context
for examining the two provinces by detailing Thailand’s strug-
gle with rural poverty over the past few decades. Third, we
analyze the proximate explanations and causal factors that
Figure 1. Growth and poverty reduction in Surin and Si-Saket. Source: NESDB, n.d.-b; National Statistics Oﬃce, n.d.-e.
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we argue explain this puzzle, and trace the causal connections
between these variables. The ﬁnal section concludes with some
insights useful for understanding the complex relationship
between economic growth and poverty reduction.
2. REVIEWING THE PATHWAYS TO POVERTY
REDUCTION
Research from a variety of disciplines oﬀers a large num-
ber of explanations for and potential pathways to poverty
reduction. First, a number of scholars focus on economic
growth as the prime mover of poverty reduction. These
scholars are further divided into a number of camps, includ-
ing those who prescribe pro-market policies (e.g., Bhagwati,
1985; Dollar & Kraay, 2002; Lal & Myint, 1996), those who
advocate import-substitution as a path to industrialization
(e.g., Frank, 1969), and those who argue that a developmen-
tal state works best for stimulating the type of growth that
eﬀectively reduces poverty (e.g., Amsden, 1996; Johnson,
1982). Second, a large group of scholars are more critical
of the pursuit of economic growth (e.g., Streeten, 1993),
arguing, for instance, that the rapid promotion of develop-
ment and economic growth actually perpetuates poverty
(Escobar, 1995), or creates an unsustainable threat to the
environment or to the Earth’s supply of natural resources
(e.g., Meadows, Randers, & Meadows, 2004). Finally, other
scholars seek a middle ground, contending that economic
growth is necessary but not suﬃcient for poverty reduction.
Deemphasizing economic growth somewhat in order to focus
on human-scale development helps to promote the kind of
growth that more directly reduces poverty (Chambers,
Pacey, & Thrupp, 1989; Max-Neef, 1991; Mehrotra &
Jolly, 1997; Schumacher, 1973).
Focusing on exceptions to the purported relationship
between economic growth and poverty reduction allows us
to adjudicate some of these debates. It allows us to ask: what
besides economic growth has caused poverty rates to decline,
as well as what prevents economic growth from beneﬁtting
the poor? While focusing on exceptions does not undermine
the commonly assumed relationship between economic growth
and poverty reduction, it can provide evidence that can be
used to conﬁrm and extend existing theories, as well as illumi-
nate new pathways to reduce deprivation. Given that Thailand
is a unitary state with policy decided at the center, it is espe-
cially surprising that outcomes diﬀered so drastically—espe-
cially in such similar provinces. This paper shows that local
leadership matters, even in countries where central control is
thought to be paramount.
This kind of research is best conducted in a country that has
experienced at least some, though varying levels of, economic
growth and poverty reduction: the presence of both factors
allows us to examine and perhaps challenge the relationship
between the two, and the varying levels of each factor allow
for some illuminating contrasts. For its part, Thailand has
had an impressive record of economic growth. According to
the World Bank (2014), GDP per capita grew from $436.6
(2005 dollars) in 1965 to $3,163.9 in 2010. This economic
growth coincided with a dramatic drop in the proportion of
the Thai population living below the national poverty line,
from 65.3% in 1988 to 16.9% in 2010. As expected, this pov-
erty reduction has not been experienced uniformly throughout
the country. As with many other developing countries, poverty
declined most rapidly in the capital and major industrial areas.
Yet, the land-locked rural northeastern region of Thailand,
known as Isan, remained quite poor at the turn of the twenty-
ﬁrst century, with 59.5% of the population remaining below
the national poverty line, calculated using a spatial index that
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Figure 2. Graphical statement of the causal mechanisms and argument.
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evaluates the cost of a basket of essential food and non-food
items (NESDB, n.d.-a). For farmers living in the Isan periph-
ery, economic and political life was traditionally centered on
the village, with most of the population practicing subsistence
agriculture. The central government and national and interna-
tional markets were remote and disengaged. As transportation
and communications improved throughout the kingdom, mar-
ket relations gradually competed with communal relations and
the national government sought more inﬂuence over and loy-
alty from farmers across Isan. Community institutions to safe-
guard against extreme poverty gradually eroded as increasing
numbers of young, able villagers migrated to work in Bang-
kok, eschewed reciprocal labor arrangements for market-
based ones, and sought quick cash from moneylenders instead
of village-based group savings schemes (Shigetomi, 1992).
Additionally, the traditional practice of households supple-
menting nutrition sources with mushrooms and vegetables
from communally managed forest areas was gradually threat-
ened by government and private initiatives to grow water-
hogging eucalyptus as a cash crop in these areas (Barua
2011, p. 180). Due primarily to Thailand’s highly fragmented
party and ministerial systems, provincial government leaders
did not systematically implement national development plans
that proposed bottom-up solutions to these problems (Rigg,
1991).
Thailand’s endemic rural poverty created the conditions for
a fundamental change in central politics. In 2001, Thaksin Shi-
nawatra’s Thai Rak Thai party swept into power in Thailand,
thanks to a new set of electoral rules, substantial personal
wealth, and a political campaign that mobilized several key
demographic groups. Over the next ﬁve years, the support of
the rural poor became increasingly critical to the expanding
power of the Thaksin administration. Not coincidentally, the
Thaksin government pursued a variety of policies that were
designed to maintain the political support of this group,
including a debt moratorium for small holding farmers, the
OTOP scheme, the Village Fund, the Health Security for All
initiative, the New Entrepreneur Promotion program, and
various other poverty reduction projects. 4
These controversial policies did reduce poverty rates in rural
Isan. The proportion of the Thai population living in poverty
(based on expenditure) declined from 42.6% in 2000 to 16.9%
in 2010. The proportion of Thais living in poverty in Isan
declined from 59.5% to 26% in the same period (NESDB,
n.d.-a). Part of this reduction could be attributed to economic
growth: Thailand’s GDP grew by an average of 5.7% per year,
while the corresponding Gross Regional Product of Isan grew
by an average of 4.2% per year during this period (World
Bank, 2014; NESDB, n.d.-b). Yet this reduction did not occur
uniformly across northeastern Thailand. Over this period, two
provinces experienced markedly diﬀerent poverty reduction
outcomes despite quite similar economic growth rates, as we
noted above.
3. SCALING UP THE SMALL SCALE: SURIN’S MICRO-
ORIENTED PROJECTS
What explains the diﬀerent rates of poverty reduction in the
two neighboring provinces (Surin and Si-Saket)? Unfortu-
nately, we lack disaggregated data that would reveal accu-
rately the speciﬁc sources of these wages and proﬁts.
However, it appears that much of the income growth in Surin
was achieved by means of two changes in agriculture. First,
Surin diversiﬁed out of agriculture to a greater extent than
did Si-Saket (see Tables 1 and 2), as farmers shifted from sub-
sistence agriculture to more substantial opportunities. Second,
as we detail below, many farmers shifted from basic rice pro-
duction to growing organic rice.
Surin was also able to grow faster in two labor-intensive
non-agriculture sectors: retail trade (Surin grew by 50% during
2000–09 compared to 23% in Si-Saket) and manufacturing
(Surin grew by 53% compared to 33% in Si-Saket). Within
manufacturing, two industries—manufacturing of textiles
and manufacturing of food products and beverages—domi-
nated the sector in both provinces. These two sectors can help
reduce rural poverty because they are both labor-intensive,
and also add value to rural products, such as silk and food.
By 2006, in addition to having far more textile ﬁrms (16,250
in Surin compared to 5,888 in Si-Saket) and generating more
revenue per food processing ﬁrm (an average of 913,150 Baht
in gross output per ﬁrm in Surin compared with 663,143 Baht
in Si-Saket), Surin’s smaller scale ﬁrms produced much more
gross output than Si-Saket’s. The vast majority (99.7%) of
all ﬁrms in Surin had 25 or fewer employees, and such ﬁrms
were responsible for 75% of the province’s total output. Si-
Saket’s small ﬁrms (25 employees or less) were similarly dom-
inant, representing 98.9% of all ﬁrms, yet they produced only
49.3% of the province’s total output. Meanwhile, while Surin’s
larger ﬁrms (50 employees or more) represented only 0.07% of
all ﬁrms (18 in total), and produced only 7.5% of gross output
from manufacturing, Si-Saket’s large ﬁrms (a total of 35) pro-
duced 33.3% of total output. Given that Surin’s gross output
from manufacturing was 43% higher than Si-Saket’s (7.47 bil-
lion Baht versus 5.54 billion Baht), and Surin’s small ﬁrms
were responsible for two-thirds of that output, Surin’s small
ﬁrms produced much more than Si-Saket’s—indeed, Surin’s
small ﬁrms produced more than Si-Saket’s total gross output
from all ﬁrms combined (National Statistics Oﬃce., n.d.-c;
National Statistics Oﬃce., n.d.-d) So according to these
macro-level data, Surin’s wholesale and retail trade
sector grew faster than Si-Saket’s; Surin’s much larger
manufacturing industry also grew faster; two labor-intensive
industries—textiles and food processing—dominated manu-
facturing; and Surin’s small-scale industries were responsible
for most of its non-agricultural production.
This paper analyzes more closely three small-scale, low-tech
industries: cooperative organic rice production, One Tambon
Table 1. Percent of income from various sources – Surin Province. (Source: Provincial Statistical Reports, Surin 2006–12)
Surin
Year Wages and
Salaries (%)
Proﬁts
(non-farming) (%)
Proﬁts
(farming) (%)
Current
Transfers (%)
Property
Income (%)
Other Cash
Income Receipts (%)
Non-Cash
Income (%)
1998 32.2 8.0 16.1 9.5 1.3 2.3 30.6
2000 25.5 12.4 11.1 13.6 8.4 1.3 27.8
2002 31.9 12.7 12.0 14.3 1.1 2.8 25.0
2004 29.7 14.5 13.7 12.2 1.5 3.9 24.4
2006 35.8 18.7 5.3 15.3 1.5 2.0 21.4
2009 29.1 19.7 7.8 13.9 0.7 3.1 25.7
4 WORLD DEVELOPMENT
One Product (OTOP), and rural tourism. These augmented
agricultural incomes and grew non-agricultural income
sources within Surin’s rural economy. Below, we trace the pro-
cesses that have allowed these three economic activities to ben-
eﬁt poorer farmers in Surin.
(a) Organic rice production
Rice production has long been the chief agricultural activity
in Thailand. With a substantial land frontier lasting up until
the 1970s, families were able to move and establish their
own rice farms with relative ease (Baker & Phongpaichit,
2014, p. 159; Ingram, 1955, p. 79). As better rural infrastruc-
ture improved channels to national and export markets,
small-scale farmers started adopting new farming practices
including the use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides. Because
of the capital requirements involved in this new method of
farming, small-scale farmers frequently resort to formal and
informal credit markets to secure the money required to pur-
chase seeds and chemicals. In addition, because agricultural
commodity prices change rapidly, farmers have been com-
pelled to borrow money to ﬁnance these investments. Many
have argued that ensuring access to suﬃcient credit reduces
poverty among small, poor farmers in developing countries
in general, as well as in Thailand speciﬁcally (e.g.,
Braverman & Gausch, 1986; Menkhoﬀ & Rungruxsirivorn,
2011). Formal banks and even government-provided pro-
grams often consider it prohibitively expensive to assess the
credit of and lend to widely ﬂung smallholder farmers. Collec-
tion is expensive, and these entities often lack the kind of
social capital needed to ensure repayment. Repaying these
loans can prove diﬃcult. A bad crop year, ﬂoods, or declining
global prices can cause a farmer to become hopelessly
indebted, particularly when farmers only have access to infor-
mal moneylenders who charge extremely high interest rates
(Aleem, 1993). As farmland is often used to secure these debts,
indebted farmers face losing their land—their main source of
livelihood—due to circumstances over which they often have
little control.
For many Thai farmers, shifting to organic farming presents
an opportunity to break this vicious cycle. Because eﬀective
organic farming requires farmers to employ natural agricul-
tural processes in order to ensure the ground is fertile and free
of pests, farmers do not have to make the same scale of invest-
ments at the start of each growing season (‘‘Freedom Farmers
Rediscover Food Security,” 2005). Organic farming allows
agriculturalists to shift what had been subsistence grain pro-
duction into a cash crop—one with high international demand
yet low cost in terms of inputs. Organic farming upgrades pro-
duction, even as it leverages farmers’ experience with tradi-
tional agricultural practices. Smallholder farmers almost
invariably need help from larger actors such as business, gov-
ernment, or societal groups that can provide links to overseas
markets. On the whole, organic agriculture has been shown to
be an eﬀective way to reduce poverty in rural regions
(Raynolds, 2004), and even if they do not shift wholly to
organic production, it can still be proﬁtable for farmers to
apply organic farming techniques (Bolwig, Gibbon, & Jones,
2009).
As a result, organic rice became a popular alternative in
Surin province (See Table 3). While production of organic jas-
mine rice increased in many rural provinces in Isan during this
Table 2. Percent of income from various sources – Si-Saket Province. (Source: Provincial Statistical Reports, Si-Saket 2006–12)
Si-Saket
Year Wages and
Salaries (%)
Proﬁts
(non-farming) (%)
Proﬁts
(farming) (%)
Current
Transfers (%)
Property
Income (%)
Other Cash
Income Receipts (%)
Non-Cash
Income (%)
1998 23.0 16.4 16.6 6.5 1.2 5.2 31.2
2000 23.9 18.8 18.4 8.2 1.9 3.6 25.3
2002 21.0 14.2 20.3 12.3 1.0 4.5 26.8
2004 29.5 11.2 21.8 9.7 0.8 4.3 22.6
2006 27.0 13.5 17.6 15.2 0.8 2.6 23.4
2009 19.6 13.4 20.7 20.6 0.6 1.4 23.7
Table 3. Organic ‘‘Hom Mali” Jasmine Rice Production in Thailand. (Source: Ministry of Commerce Organic Marketing Intelligence Center http://www.
organic.moc.go.th/production/area_cultivation)
Provinces Farmers (No.) Planting area (Rai) Produced (kg./Rai) Total produced (Ton)
Surin 33,248 482,337.27 16,349.99 214,168.69
Si Sa Ket 203 2,131.80 2,280.00 78
Suphan Buri 4 230 0.00 60
Kalasin 60 676 0.00 0
Khon Kaen 19 158 0.00 0
Chiang Mai 0 161 500.00 58.5
Nakhon Ratchasima 44 20,389.00 3,919.08 6,891.20
Buri Ram 486 7,222.00 9,260.22 3,343.80
Maha Sarakham 49 579 390.00 147.45
Mukdahan 0 596 0.00 381.6
Yasothon 10,198 173,952.80 15,265.34 49,606.81
Roi Et 3927 259,896 21,854.20 105994.31
Nongbualamphu 168 990 3,400.00 586
Uttaradit 37 323 718.90 125
Uthai Thani 57 1,270.00 948.94 611
Ubon Ratchathani 1413 31,138.00 525.60 5,220.00
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period, the results in Surin province have been astounding.
According to data from the Ministry of Commerce’s Organic
Marketing Intelligence Center (n.d.), Surin province accounts
for two-thirds of all Isan farmers engaged in cultivating ‘‘Hom
Mali” certiﬁed organic rice (by far the most common form of
Thai rice). The province also accounts for half of the total area
planted and just over half the total production area in the
region. Si-saket, by comparison, has less than half of a percent
of farmers and area planted in the region—and just over three
percent of regional production. With so many producers
directly engaged in organic farming and more employed in
supporting industries including food processing, this repre-
sents a major boon to smallholder farmers in the province.
Surin producers were able to increase their production of
more lucrative organic rice, and even managed to develop an
internationally recognized brand. This required overcoming
collective action problems associated with developing strong
quality control mechanisms and achieving suﬃcient quality.
Raynolds (2004) argues that organic production methods
and standards certiﬁcation can be very burdensome for rural
farmers with limited formal education and small, dispersed
holdings—particularly in the tropics where the know-how of
international NGO networks may be limited. Through pro-
ducers’ eﬀorts, Surin Hom Mali Organic Jasmine Rice has
emerged as a globally known brand of quality organic rice,
with over 400 tons exported in 2006. A 2006 Asian Develop-
ment Bank study found that certiﬁed organic farmers in Surin,
Ubonrachathani, and Yasathorn provinces sold their rice at
nearly double the price of conventional rice producers
(Setboonsarng, Leung, & Cai, 2006). Other studies have found
similar premiums associated with certiﬁed organic production
(Morawetz, Wongprawmas, & Haas, 2007), particularly for
farms involved in the Fair Trade Network (Becchetti,
Conzo, & Gianfreda, 2012).
Many farmers in Si-Saket have also moved into organic
farming; though the province’s organic output is signiﬁcantly
lower than that of Surin province, it is still one of Thailand’s
top producers of organic rice. Unlike Surin, however, there is
little certiﬁed organic production, despite a larger overall agri-
cultural sector. The director of one NGO in Si-Saket indicated
that some communities have local markets for ‘‘green” agricul-
ture but these are unconnected, feature no systematic certiﬁca-
tion process, and tend to be for local consumption (Interview
46). To the extent that large-scale organic production does
occur in Si-Saket, it is undertaken by members of the Santi
Asoke religious group. This Buddhist sect maintains the entire
value chain, from fertilizer to cultivation to milling to packag-
ing to sales. The group is not market oriented and uses (uncer-
tiﬁed) organic production methods because they are in line
with their beliefs rather than to gain the market premium asso-
ciated with organic agriculture (Ellis, Panyakul, Vildozo, &
Kasterine, 2006; Kaufman, 2012; Lorlowhakarn et al., 2008).
Thus, although comparative analyses of organic agriculture
in Thailand often make note of the Asoke group in Si-Saket
(Chamontri, 2009; Ellis et al., 2006; Patrawart, 2009), its
impact on local poverty is largely limited to members of the
religious group, and even that impact is muted.
(b) One Tambon One Product
Second, Surin did especially well in one central government
initiative intended to spark local handicrafts and provide alter-
native incomes for low-income farmers. OTOP is a micro-
development initiative implemented by the Thai national gov-
ernment, based on the Japanese One Village One Product
scheme. Under this policy, local producers can register their
products with a government agency. Each OTOP producer
is rated anywhere between 1–5 stars depending on product
marketability, production capacity, and potential for creating
spillovers within the local economy. Importantly, to achieve a
high rating, producers must demonstrate their distinct provin-
cial identity, use of indigenous knowledge and local wisdom,
use of local raw materials and labor, contribution to knowl-
edge transformation and diﬀusion in the community, and
commitment to preserving local culture and traditions. Each
of these can potentially reduce poverty.
The highest rated producers are rewarded with product pro-
motion, grants, loans, and assistance facilitating export. As of
2008 over 1.3 million members and employees nationwide
worked in 37,840 OTOP producers, with many enjoying
increases in household income. About two-thirds of all OTOP
producers were community-based enterprises, according to
2010 statistics (Natsuda, Igusa, Wiboonpongse, & Thoburn,
2012, p. 376). A number of complementary government-
organized micro-credit ﬁnancing programs, including the Vil-
lage Development Fund, the People’s Bank Program, and the
Bank for Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises, were estab-
lished around the same time, increasing farmers’ access to
credit and reducing ﬁnancial constraints more eﬀectively than
formal ﬁnancial institutions (Kaboski & Townsend, 2012;
Menkhoﬀ & Rungruxsirivorn, 2011), that could be used to
get their OTOP ventures started.
The program has the potential to help farmers in many
ways. First, subsistence farmers can supplement their incomes
by engaging in production piecemeal for an existing producer
or cooperative. These activities, which can be done during the
agriculture oﬀ-season, help to employ surplus labor. Second,
enterprising individuals or families are able to establish their
own operations locally, an alternative to the costly and risky
step of moving to the city in search of opportunity. This leads
to more direct beneﬁts to the local economy, as well as less
social dislocation in the community and the preservation of
village institutions geared toward helping the poor. Third,
relatedly, these local institutions facilitate the development
of social capital as producers share techniques, marketing
strategies, and resources. Since the bulk of the OTOP products
were at least in part developed from traditional practices and
techniques, the program has the potential to beneﬁt segments
of society who would otherwise be unable to beneﬁt from the
market economy.
On the other hand, critics underscore a number of ﬂaws in
the OTOP program. One common criticism has been that
the government did not eﬀectively target the poor with these
eﬀorts. Indeed, few among the poorest in Thai society—the
severely disabled for instance—would be in a position to start
such an entrepreneurial venture. Many cases have been identi-
ﬁed where already successful businesses made use of OTOP
resources, watering down the program’s impact on poverty
reduction (Phadungkiati, Kusakabe, & Pongquan, 2012, p.
51). Some critics suggest that the Thaksin administration did
not better target the poor, either because the prime minister
was more interested in keeping the rural poor politically
dependent on his party or because he was more concerned
about using the program as a part of a ﬁscal stimulus designed
to help the country to recover from the East Asian Economic
Crisis. Second and related, the success of early movers were
undermined as other entrepreneurs and villagers mimicked
their strategies and products, leading to an oversupply of some
products and a decline in their market value (Natsuda et al.,
2012, p. 375).
In spite of these studies, the impact of the OTOP program
has been insuﬃciently researched. Most studies of OTOP have
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either examined a few districts or sub-districts in great detail
or made generalizations based on aggregate patterns across
the country. There were some exceptions. Kurokawa,
Tembo, and Willem’s (2010) survey of two provinces found
that majorities in both evaluated the eﬀectiveness of OTOP
positively, but that support in the poorer of the two provinces
was even higher, reaching 75%. A review of Chiang Mai’s
OTOP producers conducted by Natsuda et al. (2012) found
that OTOP was helpful for community-based enterprises to
establish themselves and for providing opportunities for vul-
nerable segments of the population, such as older workers.
Although Tangpianpant (2010) noted that OTOP was associ-
ated with improving employment, using local materials and
knowledge, and curbing out-migration from rural areas, she
argued that the program generally favored existing successful
producers and failed to target suﬃciently or support the poor-
est in these areas. This left many poorly rated OTOP produc-
ers (those that received only one or two stars) with debt when
their products did not succeed (Tangpianpant, 2010). One aca-
demic we interviewed in Bangkok—a specialist in Thailand’s
development—cited these reasons in dismissing the signiﬁ-
cance of the program (Interview 9).
Thus, the literature reveals mixed assessments about the
eﬀectiveness of OTOP. On the one hand, in many case studies
of one or a few tambons, OTOP seems to have helped the poor
and been viewed favorably by participants. On the other, inef-
fective implementation undermines the potential beneﬁts of
OTOP. To date, there has been little systematic, comparative
analysis of varying success rates of OTOP production across
provinces. The research on OTOP so far suggests diﬀerent
levels of success across provinces. This indicates that some
local factor, such as organizing capabilities from provincial
governments or civil society to implement and support OTOP
producers, is needed to explain the variation in the degree of
success of this central policy initiative across Thailand’s pro-
vinces (Kurokawa et al., 2010). As noted above, a successful
project under the OTOP ranking system is one that makes
intensive use of local capabilities, content, and traditional
knowledge.
Surin province has done remarkably well in upgrading their
OTOP production activities. It has had the second largest
number of the highest, 5-star-ranking products in the country.
It is not only the highest in Isan, but also the highest outside of
the Bangkok area. Surin has had at least double (and most
years more than triple) the number of 5-star-ranked products
compared to that of neighboring Si-Saket. It also has substan-
tially more 4-star products. (See Table 4 for the distribution of
OTOP producers for the two provinces). Additionally, OTOP
producers in Surin have been successful in selling their goods
to consumers in Europe, the United States, and Japan.
One OTOP producer we visited in Khwao Sinarin district,
Surin, during our ﬁeldwork produced silver jewelry. This pro-
ducer both purchases pure silver craft jewelry from several
dozen villagers and hires locals to produce jewelry using tradi-
tional production methods and designs (Interview 8). Because
the producer was able to demonstrate quality, capacity, and
the utilization of local materials and contents, its products
received a high OTOP rating and were eligible for local gov-
ernment help in marketing and making connections with buy-
ers outside the province and overseas. This district served as a
hub for OTOP in the province. Just under one-third of all of
Surin’s OTOP producers and just over a third of the total
OTOP sales revenues were located in this district. Silver and
Thai silk producers are, in particular, well represented. There
are several local outlets for marketing silver, including OTOP
shops, tourism sites in Surin, as well as markets along the
Cambodian border. Agents, attracted by the concentration
of small-scale producers, also come into the village directly
to purchase in bulk to sell within Thailand or for export.
Finally, tourists from Thailand and abroad attend exhibitions
and festivals that occur periodically throughout the province
in order to market OTOP handicrafts. The provincial govern-
ment helps to organize the Thai Silk Festival in Khwao
Sinarin district. The festival promotes the popular Mon-
Khmer style silk and silver products, such as via cultural
dances and fashion shows highlighting the high-quality OTOP
products based upon ancient jewelry designs (Serireongrith,
2014). A similar example is the annual Surin Elephant
Roundup Festival, during which visitors travel to Surin for
a variety of events centered on the community’s close relation-
ship with elephants. OTOP producers from all over the pro-
vince travel to the fair to market their wares. To extend the
reach beyond the local market, the locals rely on outside
agents—including commercial agents, local Community
Development Department (CDD) oﬃcials, and non-
government agencies—to tie them to the international market.
A similar story could be told with other types of OTOP
products. We visited single villages or sets of villages that were
organized into small groups engaged in producing products
ranging from carved wooden furniture to hand-woven plastic
bags, from silk to woven baskets. Because villagers produce
handicrafts in the local area, they remained engaged in the
community, reducing brain drain and diversifying the local
economy. Villagers pursued these productive activities while
continuing to farm, diversifying their own income.
As with the organic rice, the OTOP explanation is satisfying
only in accounting for some of the alternative sources of
income for Surin’s poor. There were opportunities for people
in Surin to supplement their agricultural incomes with per-
piece work in the oﬀ-season as small-scale entrepreneurs or
Table 4. OTOP products by quality. (Source: Calculated based on data provided at www.thaitambon.com)
Province 2003 2004 2006 2010 2012
Si-Saket-1 Star 0 0 15 9 4
Si-Saket-2 Star 0 0 98 72 77
Si-Saket-3 Star 102 115 122 79 75
Si-Saket-4 Star 35 29 53 89 75
Si-Saket-5 Star 2 5 6 19 26
Surin-1 Star 0 0 5 6 10
Surin-2 Star 0 0 49 42 45
Surin-3 Star 131 119 123 62 40
Surin-4 Star 51 34 95 120 132
Surin-5 Star 0 18 13 67 80
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craft workers. Below, we argue that the success of OTOP in
Surin is linked to locally embedded civil society and social cap-
ital, as well as the unusual commitment of local government
leaders.
By contrast, producers in Si-Saket have not been as suc-
cessful. Although data on OTOP revenues for the entire per-
iod under investigation proved elusive, it is clear that in
recent years the bulk of Si-Saket’s OTOP revenue comes
from the top four or ﬁve producers, with a much larger por-
tion of producers earning very little and achieving only one
or two stars (Community Development Department., n.d.).
By 2012, the top ﬁve OTOP producers generated just under
70% of the total OTOP revenue for the province and Si-
Saket’s median OTOP producer generated 109,750 Baht in
revenue (the lowest in the country). In Surin, by comparison,
the top ﬁve producers generated 32% of total revenue while
the median producer in that province generated 384,000
Baht. Thus, OTOP in Si-Saket seems to follow some of the
patterns observed for the program more generally, that a
few already established producers beneﬁted greatly while
the groups of small producers that were the original target
of the program largely ﬂoundered.
(c) Rural-based tourism
Rural-based tourism is another area in which Surin excels in
funneling a higher proportion of the beneﬁts to the rural poor.
Tourism, an industry responsible for ﬁve percent of global
GDP and responsible for about one in every 12 jobs world-
wide (UNWorld Tourism Organization, 2015), is often lauded
for its potential to reduce poverty in rural areas such as Isan.
Proponents argue rural-based tourism is the most labor-
intensive industry outside of agriculture, and one that often
provides opportunities for the participation of poorly edu-
cated low-income people (e.g., UN World Tourism
Organization, 2002). Local, rural-based tourism jobs can
employ farmers during the oﬀ-season, and provide employ-
ment that does not require travel or migration to the cities.
For its part, Thailand has beneﬁtted greatly from tourism.
International tourism to Thailand in 2013 ranked tenth in
the world in popularity (27 million tourist arrivals, represent-
ing 23% growth) and seventh in tourism receipts (US$42 bil-
lion) (UN World Tourism Organization, 2014). While much
of this tourism ﬂows to Bangkok and beaches in the south,
some of it is in rural areas, such as in Isan.
Despite its potential, the actual link between rural tourism
and poverty reduction depends on the manner in which the
industry is structured. While many argue that tourism is a
labor-intensive, cost-eﬀective way of reducing poverty, others
counter that the industry is instead a capital-intensive one
(e.g., Tisdell, 1998). Whether it beneﬁts the poor or not
depends in large part on whether it is structured to include
or exclude the participation of the poor (e.g., Mowforth &
Munt, 2003; Tisdell, 2001). Some tourist spots are designed
speciﬁcally to include the poor, for instance by employing
poor rural residents, promoting their handicrafts and services,
encouraging the development of local small businesses, and
consciously purchasing agricultural products from local farm-
ers. Others intentionally exclude the poor through, for
instance, fencing them out, changing ticket prices or licensing
fees, and enforcing ordinances that prevent poor people from
‘‘harassing” tourists. Still other areas are more neutral, neither
encouraging nor discouraging the poor from participating.
The type of structure that each area adopts shapes the way
the poor interact with the industry, and determines whether
they beneﬁt from its development.
Surin province has been quite eﬀective in developing attrac-
tions and events that bring in Thai and international tourists.
Moreover, much is done to ensure that these visitors’ con-
sumption patterns beneﬁt the rural residents of Surin and
strengthen local communities. For example, as noted above,
each November, Surin hosts an internationally recognized ele-
phant festival, featuring a traditional elephant round-up, bat-
tle reenactments, and games. Visitors are encouraged to take
advantage of eco-friendly tourist activities, stay in village
homestays, and purchase locally sourced OTOP and other
products. Additionally, the local government and NGOs have
worked together to further leverage the tourist inﬂux associ-
ated with the round-up in order to help ethnically Suay mah-
outs, whose traditional skill at caring for elephants is no
longer in demand. The Surin Project was developed to provide
sanctuary for elephants when their owners cannot ﬁnd work
and training for mahouts to explore new opportunities in
eco-tourism. As a result, tourist dollars are channeled into
numerous homestay options rather than large capital-
intensive resorts.
Other Surin festivals and events have been structured to
beneﬁt local communities. In addition to the Elephant Festival
mentioned above, the Organic Hom Mali Day and Silk Fabric
Festival, the Surin International Folklore Festival, and more
recently the Khong Dee Muang Surin Festival each highlights
and reinforces local culture and traditions and oﬀers local
small producers the chance to market their goods. The Green
Market, a weekly open market for organic farmers and OTOP
producers to sell their goods, is also a regular draw for tour-
ists, whether in the area for one of the many festivals or pass-
ing through on their way to Cambodia.
Si-Saket also boasts many visitors, but these are mainly
tourists headed through the province to get to the popular
Angkor Wat temple in neighboring Siem Reap, Cambodia,
or the Preah Vihear Temple on the border. Although there
are festivals in the province, they have not captured the
national and international tourist market in the same way that
Surin’s have. The provincial administration has promoted the
Dok Lamduan Ban festival to highlight the natural beauty of
the region and its people and sell local goods, though it has
been much smaller in scale than the festivals of Surin.
Thus, we would expect tourists in Si-Saket to mainly pass
through the province, and not spend much time or money
there. In Surin, by contrast, we would expect to see possibly
fewer visitors, but that they would be staying longer to enjoy
the tourist attractions within the province. The statistics—
which distinguish between visitors who do not stay the night
and tourists who stay at least over night—reﬂect these
patterns. On the surface, tourism in Si-Saket seems robust—
nearly as robust as in Surin. In 2006, the Thai National Statis-
tics Oﬃce reported 712,515 visitors to Si-Saket, just under
Surin’s number of 784,694. The number of visitors to Si-Saket
(881,218) grew to exceed the number of visitors in Surin
(809,608) by 2010. While Surin’s visitors increased to
892,860 in 2011, Si-Saket’s number soared to over one million
(1,066,129). Thus, superﬁcially at least Si-Saket’s tourism
seems more popular than Surin’s. Indeed, Si-Saket saw a much
greater rate of economic growth in the category of ‘‘hotels and
restaurants” (which captures only some of the economic value
of tourism) compared to Surin during 2000–09 (NESDB, n.d.-
b).
However, the two provinces diﬀer greatly when the number
of visitors is broken down between number of tourists (those
who stay in the province) and excursionists (those who pass
through without staying). Given the province’s reputation as
a through point for Angor Wat, we would expect a higher
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proportion of visitors to Si-Saket were excursionists, com-
pared to Surin with its relatively greater variety and more
notable tourism sites. Indeed, more than about 70% of Surin’s
visitors were tourists, compared to just approximately 37% of
Si-Saket’s. In 2011, when Si-Saket’s visitors topped one mil-
lion, it recorded only 393,695 tourists, 59% lower than Surin’s
624,321 tourists. As expected, visitors and tourists to Surin
also spend more each day than those who visit Si-Saket. Surin
visitors in 2011 spent an average of 809 Baht per day while
tourists spent 860 Baht per day, some 17–18% higher than
Si-Saket’s average of 684 Baht per day for visitors and 735
Baht per day for tourists. Consequentially, despite Si-Saket’s
higher visitor numbers, Surin’s tourism receipts exceed those
of Si-Saket by 10% in 2009 (818 million Baht versus 746 mil-
lion Baht), and 34% in 2011 (1.58 billion Baht versus 1.145 bil-
lion Baht).
More importantly, Surin’s tourism industry is better struc-
tured to beneﬁt rural residents. Unlike Si-Saket, Surin boasts
of several tourism sites in a number of rural areas. These areas
are more easily accessible for farmers seeking to sell products to
tourists, and farmers nearby beneﬁt from tourism through the
purchase of food and other farm products. While these sites
are small in scale and do not provide many opportunities for
long-term employment, formal and informal ad hoc functions
can be performed by local residents who can supplement their
incomes from farming. Moreover, the various festivals, such
as the elephant festival, are major draws and provide periodic
opportunities for farmers and other rural residents to supple-
ment their incomes.While these volumes aremodest per farmer,
they are signiﬁcant in proportion to their overall incomes, and
provide a diversity of income sources. Rural tourism is also
linked to the sales of OTOP products, which, as argued above,
has proved an important source of income for farmers.
Si-Saket’s tourism, though boasting a higher GDP and
growth rate in hotels and restaurants, is also not structured
to beneﬁt local residents to the same extent as Surin’s. Most
visitors do not stay long in the province, and those that do stay
spend less. In terms of the industry’s structure, moreover, Si-
Saket’s industry is less beneﬁcial for rural residents.
4. CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL CAPITAL AS A
CATALYST AND INTERVENING VARIABLE IN
SURIN PROVINCE
Thus, the greater success that Surin’s farmers had in moving
into higher proﬁt organic agriculture and related industries,
combined with their greater ability to participate in OTOP
and rural tourism projects, helped to increase the incomes of
low-income farmers in Surin province. Yet these proximate-
factor explanations raise related questions. Farmers in
Si-Saket and elsewhere in Isan also moved into organic rice pro-
duction, yet they failed to achieve the success that Surin has
experienced. Similarly, Si-Saket, as well as other Isan pro-
vinces, implemented OTOP and promoted rural tourism.
Why was Surin province more successful than not only its
neighbors in Isan, but also nearly every province in Thailand?
Despite the many similarities between Surin and Si-Saket,
for a variety of historical reasons, the two provinces have fol-
lowed divergent paths of institutional development at the local
and provincial levels. Of the divergent features, one promi-
nently stands out. Over the last twenty years, Surin has devel-
oped a vibrant civil society that interacted dynamically with
the provincial government to help micro-developmental initia-
tives succeed by facilitating collective action among farmers
and entrepreneurs.
Although the formal political institutional structures in
Thailand actively suppressed rural mobilization prior to the
1980s, traditions of community activism at the village and
sub district levels persisted. Local institutions such as rice
banks, buﬀalo banks, savings groups, cooperative shops, and
community forests and irrigation groups were established to
facilitate village members’ pooling of resources to protect
themselves from the insecurities of weather and market. These
structures spread throughout the country in the 1980s as the
central government made rural development a higher priority.
Additionally, farmers established systems of cooperative labor
exchange in order to adjust to seasonal shortages of labor
(Parnwell, 2007; Shigetomi, 1992). Animist and Buddhist
beliefs about collective membership in the village community,
in turn, reinforced these institutions of collective action
(Shigetomi, 1992). As frontier land diminished in the 1960s
and 70s and labor markets emerged, the use of traditional
forms of cooperative labor declined.
In the 1970s, many of Thailand’s university students trav-
eled upcountry to conduct experiential ﬁeldwork on the living
conditions of rural Thais. A number of these students were
strongly aﬀected by these experiences and subsequently devel-
oped and advocated a ‘‘community culture” development path
that would inﬂuence the work of civil society activists through-
out the country (Hewison, 1993), and especially in Surin. The
1976 massacre at Thammasat University and subsequent
crackdowns by the Thanin government further drove large
numbers of these communitarian-minded students to take
refuge with the Communist Party of Thailand in remote jungle
areas. The Cambodian border near Surin and Si-Saket became
one of the key areas for these groups (Girling, 1985; Keyes,
1995). Even after the government granted an amnesty in the
1980s, many of these former student leaders remained upcoun-
try and initiated locally oriented development projects
(Parnwell, 2007; Phatharathananunt, 2002). Around the same
time, large numbers of refugees from Cambodia ﬂed to Surin,
where international and non-government organizations placed
them into organized camps. The area became a hub for local
and international NGOs providing services for the refugees.
Many of these NGOs also provided services to locals and con-
tinued operating after the camps were closed down
(Shigetomi, 2009).
This combination of committed, locally embedded leaders
with substantial experience and networks of local, national,
and international contacts resulted in a vibrant civil society
throughout Surin province. Not only did these activists estab-
lish and manage local initiatives to ﬁght poverty and foster
community solidarity, some were inﬂuential in the evolution
of the ‘‘community culture” neolocalist movement. Even in a
region characterized by NGO activism, Surin’s rich networks
of NGOs were remarkable. As one scholar concluded, ‘‘com-
pared with other provinces, Surin had ample NGO resources,”
(Shigetomi, 2009, p. 66). One NGO director in Si-Saket put it
even more emphatically, remarking that Surin became the
‘‘NGO capital of Isan” (Interview 14).
Political events in the early 1990s caused NGOs to become
even more closely networked in Surin. In 1990, the military
instituted Khor Jor Kor, a forestry program designed to reor-
ganize land use in the country’s national forest reserves. The
policy, which would have displaced thousands of families to
make room for commercial plantations, garnered widespread
opposition among people in Isan and motivated communitar-
ian NGOs to mobilize and coordinate their activities to protect
farmers’ interests. A civil disobedience campaign emerged and
grew steadily until mass demonstrations led to the cancelation
of the program in 1992. This campaign coincided with protests
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to eject General Suchinda from the premiership in 1992
(Shigetomi, 2009). Both had a lasting impact on this network
of rural community activists.
In Surin, a senior activist created the Surin Forum as a space
for members of civil society—including NGO staﬀ, farmers,
teachers, and even business people—to meet and exchange
ideas about public issues (Shigetomi, 2009, p. 66). Over the
course of the 1990s, this group of professionals and activists
gradually formed a semi-formal network that often worked
directly with government and international institutions to pro-
mote community development in Surin. Its capacity improved
gradually as it developed administrative capabilities and a pro-
fessional staﬀ. Table 5 lists some of the agencies contracting
with the Surin Forum around 2001 and the projects they
implemented.
The civil society organizations in Surin worked together
exchanging ideas and information, undertaking research, and
providing training for development initiatives (Shigetomi
2009, p. 66). This remarkably dense, well-organized network
helped facilitate the successful utilization of central govern-
ment micro-development initiatives. Programs like OTOP
thrived in this environment, especially in improving the poor’s
access to ﬁnance. Additionally, this enabled networking orga-
nizations to work closely with the local government to inter-
vene on behalf of vulnerable members of the community in
the event of natural disasters and other crises. For example
the Surin Forum established a committee made up of local
community leaders to discuss water resource use and manage
ﬂoods (Shigetomi, 2009).
While interview and archival research revealed the clear
importance of local community organizations to the micro
development projects in Surin, the information from Si-
Saket reveals much by omission. That is, where information
is available, it points to programs pursued in earnest by the
local government but without the cooperation of a dense net-
work of community organizations.
(a) Organic rice and local civil society
The tremendous success experienced by Surin in growing,
processing, certifying, and marketing organic agriculture
depended greatly upon leadership, ideology, and engagement.
The groups that had formed in the 1980s helped encourage
and facilitate the shift to growing organic rice in a number
of key ways. First, they provided important training and edu-
cation. Smallholder farmers began exploring the possibility of
transitioning to organic agriculture in the early 1990s.
Concerned about illness related to pesticides, ﬂuctuating mar-
ket prices, and indebtedness, farmers in Surin formed the Nat-
ural Agriculture Group (NAG) in 1992, with the assistance of
NGOs like Surin Farmer Support (SFS). These organizations
help farmers to identify and begin to disseminate a set of best
practices for organic farming. Over the next 20 years a wide
array of nongovernmental organizations developed to assist
smallholder farmers engaged in organic agriculture. Organiza-
tions such as SFS and the Organic Rice Fund in Surin trained
farmers in the use of organic farming processes and organic
fertilizers (Woranoot, 2009).
Second, these organizations worked to reduce imbalances
that emerge when smallholder farmers interact with larger
and more powerful networks of market actors. For instance,
distributional conﬂicts between distributors, processors, mid-
dlemen, and farmers have the potential to develop between
upstream and downstream segments of the agricultural supply
chain. For example, conﬂicts between sugar cane producers
and millers over the costs of resolving bottlenecks and the
equitable distribution of proﬁts presented a major challenge
to that sector throughout the 1980s (Doner, 2009). Many rice
farmers had substantial experience with a middleman system
which limited the agency of farmers (Sukpanich, 2003). The
NAG was established speciﬁcally to counter the power that
traders and mill owners had over the prices paid to farmers
(Chamontri, 2009, p. 32). Many collective organic farmers
groups in Surin, such as the NAG, the Prasart Cooperative,
and Bua Kok organic Hom Mali rice producer, helped to
overcome upstream–downstream conﬂicts by purchasing and
operating their own mills (Chamontri, 2009, pp. 32–33).
Third, this dense network of NGOs helped connect small-
holder farmers to the international market. For instance, they
have reached out to international NGOs to market their
organic products, which helped them sell Fair Trade rice to
Europe and the United States (‘‘Freedom Farmers
Rediscover Food Security,” 2005). These organizations also
helped farmers comply with the standards certiﬁcation bodies
such as the Organic Agriculture Certiﬁcation of Thailand and
the Surin Province Organic Certiﬁcation. NGO leaders sug-
gested that this training was especially important because
compliance with strict international certiﬁcation auditing pro-
cedures is particularly onerous for farmers with little formal
education (Interview 30).
These eﬀorts began attracting oﬃcial support. As early as
2000, Surin provincial governor Kasemsak Sanpote made it
clear that the facilitation of Surin organic rice was among
his top priorities. He stressed the important role of local civil
Table 5. Surin forum activities. (Source: Taken from Shigetomi (2009, p. 68))
Agency Type Project
National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) Government agency The 9th national development plan National
Economic and Social Advisory Commission Border
area development promoting suﬃcient
economy and civil society
Health System Reform Oﬃce Government agency Health system reform
Election Commission Government agency Election coordination
Upper House Government agency Human rights committee
Community Organization Development Institute (CODI) Independent state agency Provincial coordinator Livable City Project
SIF oﬃce (SOFO) Independent state agency Networking on river basin Community master plan
P-NET NGO Poll-watch activities
Foundation for Consumers NGO Networking consumers
Thailand Volunteer Service NGO Community radio
NGO Coordination Committee for Development NGO People’s plan
The Foundation for Child Development NGO Radio broadcast campaign
Agent unknown NGO Educational reform
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society in fostering the development of organic agriculture,
‘‘The work has been established on a large scale. . . There are
quite a number of persons in Surin who are highly respected
for their long advocacy of alternative and organic farming.
Some have networks in foreign countries where they sell their
produce. The farmers only need the knowledge and the belief.”
(Sukpanich, 2003). Indeed, prior to becoming governor, Mr.
Kasemsak had been inﬂuenced by ‘‘local wisdom” leader
and integrated farming advocate Maha Yoo Soonthornchai,
as well as integrated farming community organizer Eiad
Depoon (Interviews 19, 25).
Kasemsak’s championing of the organic agriculture cause
brought oﬃcial state recognition and support to the dense net-
work of civil society organizations. Provincial agencies helped
to coordinate the activities of organized civil society. These, in
turn, were especially proactive. Even as local NGOs developed
a training curriculum based on Thai and international experi-
ence, the provincial government helped secure funds to build
capacity and provided training centers at local schools. Mean-
while, local ‘‘development monks,” led by Surin’s Abbot Nan,
spread the word about the moral and material beneﬁts of the
practices and helped secure additional training at local temples
(Interviews 19, 25). 5 His eﬀorts also reinforced many of the
NGO’s initiatives, including helping them extend their reach
into the international market place. For instance, the governor
held brand-marketing workshops to gather ideas from opera-
tors of rice mills, agriculture cooperatives, farmers groups, and
related state bodies (‘‘Thailand: Surin to hold workshop on
Surin Hom Mali rice brand marketing,” 2005). PM Thaksin
lauded the scale of the provincial administration’s eﬀorts, not-
ing, ‘‘Surin provincial authorities taught 34,000 farmers about
organic farming with a budget of over 10 million Baht from
Tambon administration organizations” (‘‘Pilot project
tapping into growing market,” 2001).
In this way, Governor Kasemsak was able to serve as the
bridge between the locally led development approach that
had ﬂourished among civil society groups in Surin and the
national government. Moreover, Kasemsek also worked
directly with NGOs, sitting on the board, for example, of
Surin Net Foundation, one of the largest community develop-
ment NGOs in the province (Interviews 19, 25, 33). Two key
initiatives sourced from Bangkok during this period helped
to undergird and support Kasemsek’s policies, making his
bridging especially successful during this period. First, Thak-
sin’s center-led policies speciﬁcally targeted the rural poor,
so the groundwork of capacity building established by the net-
work of NGOs made fertile ground for many national policies.
Second, the central bureaucracy had, by this time, embraced
the rhetoric, if not the substance, of the Suﬃciency Economy
Philosophy (SEP) articulated by the long-sitting Thai King,
Bhumibol Adulyadej, in the midst of the 1997 economic crisis
(Pasuk, 2005). Though scholars debate whether this philoso-
phy is best thought of as an elite myth (Dayley, 2011), a primer
to ‘‘indigenize capitalism among broad social groups” (Unger,
2009, p. 147), or a middle path ‘‘in developing the economy to
keep up with the world in the era of globalization,” (Baker,
2007, p. xv), it is clear that the SEP discourse was widely used
among the government bureaucracy during and after PM
Thaksin. Regardless of whether SEP is substantial or not,
micro-oriented programs like organic agriculture and OTOP
could be easily justiﬁed on the basis of the SEP philosophy.
Civil society in Si-Saket, by comparison, remained frag-
mented and had little connection with the development of
organic rice in the province. Though many local organizations
exist at the village and municipality level in Si-Saket, we found
no province-wide organizations that coordinated activities and
provided organic certiﬁcation training and capacity building
to farmers. No community organizers or academics that we
interviewed in the region could identify any NGOs performing
these functions (e.g., interviews 15, 21, 33, 39). Santi Asoke
does provide some training in working without pesticides
and chemical fertilizers and manages the value-chain for those
that choose to produce for their network, including rice mills.
Yet, because the organization does not seek to proﬁt from
their operations and so do not seek to certify or sell to global
markets, Santi Asoke has limited impact (Chamontri, 2009,
p.33; Kaufman & Mock, 2014). Governor Thanom Songserm
did attempt to promote organic agriculture in the province in
2003 (Dayley, 2011), but his eﬀorts proved short-lived since he
served less than two years in oﬃce.
(b) OTOP and local NGOs
A similar dynamic occurred with OTOP, a program that
was designed speciﬁcally to leverage local capacities and tradi-
tional knowledge while strengthening community and ﬁghting
outward migration. With a dense network of community orga-
nizations to draw upon, Surin provincial administrators imple-
menting OTOP were able to organize activities and promote
products that reinforced each other. For example, Surin oﬃ-
cials worked closely with community organizations to develop
local tourism during the annual Elephant Festival in such a
way as to highlight and promote local OTOP producers. They
have since gone further to develop and promote eco-tourism
and home-stay destinations that spread tourism to local com-
munities in more remote areas of the province. In many ways,
local NGOs supported OTOP initiatives only indirectly by
aggressively promoting local capacity and ‘‘local wisdom,”
thereby improving the capacity of local producers who then
made the most of government OTOP programs themselves.
Indeed, many organizers were ambivalent about the success
of OTOP because of the commodiﬁcation of local culture they
represented (Interviews 25, 33).
While in Surin province, we visited a number of OTOP estab
lishments—small-scale, family-based groups producing local
products, such as silver jewelry, furniture, decorative wooden
containers, and other such products. While many such enter-
prises fail, the statistics and the evidence from ﬁeldwork both
reveal that Surin has enjoyed an unusual level of success. This
was due in part to the provincial government’s eﬀorts to
expand markets for OTOP handicraft producers, both market-
ing locally for tourists, as well as throughout the country and
overseas. Thus, in the case of OTOP as well, it was clear that
the social organization and the local political support were
both crucial.
OTOP production in Si-Saket seems more consistent with
the national pattern. By 2012 we see a few very proﬁtable pro-
ducers and a great many small producers that fail to surpass
the 1–2 star range (calculated based on data from
Community Development Department, n.d.). As with organic
agriculture, interviews and archival research revealed no
strong network of organizations in the province (e.g., inter-
views 15, 21, 26, 33, 39, 49). This suggests that while there
may be a pool of local knowledge at the village level, it has
not beneﬁted from the coordinative capacities that such a net-
work could bring.
(c) Tourism and civil society
The provincial government and civil society targeted local
tourism as a way to help the local community. As mentioned
above, the Surin Forum and farmers collectives have worked
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to bring the Green Market and the Organic Hom Mali Day
and Silk Fabric Festival to showcase their members’ products.
Likewise, the Silk Festival, the Khong Dee Muang Surin Fes-
tival, and the Surin International Folklore festival not only
oﬀer a channel to sell local wares, but to celebrate and rein-
force communal bonds. The Surin Forum and the Elephant
Nature Foundation’s work with the provincial government
to help vulnerable minorities in the province get the most
out of the inﬂux of tourism are prime examples of this. Gover-
nor Kasemsak also played an important role in identifying key
local sites in the province he thought could be eﬀectively devel-
oped. In 2010, the Thailand Tourism Council gave him an
award for his ‘‘signiﬁcant contributions to the development
and management of regional tourist attractions” (Tourism
Council of Thailand, 2010). One could easily imagine an alter-
native structure of tourism, where a capital-intensive elephant
theme park and resort with a centralized structure channels
proﬁts to already aﬄuent investors and shuts out low-
income local residents. Community organizations and NGOs
are active partners in not only providing the traditional con-
tent for many of the events, but also the deep connections that
ensure that the income from tourism are spread more widely.
As with OTOP, some of the local NGOs that improved the
capacity of tourism sites by promoting ‘‘local wisdom,” were
also ambivalent about the success in tourism because of the
resulting commodiﬁcation of culture and increasing market
orientation of those involved (Interviews 25, 33).
5. CONCLUSION
What explains poverty reduction that occurs at a pace that
cannot be fully accounted for by economic growth? By com-
paring two similar provinces in Thailand that experienced
comparable rates of GDP-measured economic growth, but
that have enjoyed signiﬁcantly diﬀerent degrees of poverty
reduction, we have been able to identify through an inductive
process the kinds of economic activity and socio-political fac-
tors that seem to explain the poverty reduction diﬀerences.
Surin, our evidence suggests, has traversed a path toward pov-
erty reduction because key actors have encouraged local orga-
nization of small-scale activities in which poorly educated
rural residents could participate. Thai political leaders, NGOs,
and farmers concentrated on three central government poli-
cies, implementing them especially well and in a way that con-
tributed signiﬁcantly to poverty reduction. Farmers not only
shifted into organic rice—a move that greatly increased their
incomes—but managed to establish an internationally recog-
nized brand. The OTOP initiative allowed low-income farmers
to produce handicrafts in their own homes or communities,
under the support of a program intended to link them to inter-
national markets. Finally, rural tourism was structured so as
to beneﬁt poor farmers, OTOP producers, and vulnerable
groups. Rural residents could participate more directly in rural
tourism. Festivals showcased local products and encouraged
tourists to see and experience local traditions.
But the identiﬁcation of policies that helped to create the
conditions for poverty reduction is not on its own a satisfying
explanation. After all, Thailand is a unitary state—central
policies apply to all the provinces. Moreover, Surin’s neigh-
bors also implemented OTOP and at least attempted to partic-
ipate in rural tourism and organic rice production. To answer
this puzzle and make it useful for theory and policy, we exam-
ine what factors allowed Surin to succeed in these policies to a
much greater extent than its neighbors. Here, political and
social forces both appeared to be important. First, our
evidence revealed that political conﬂicts in Bangkok pushed
students to the hinterland. Many socially active and well-
educated youth ended up on the Cambodian border, many
in the province of Surin. Once the conﬂict ended, these youth
became skilled and successful organizers. They established a
number of NGOs that were designed to help local farmers
and resist central policies that harmed their interests. Addi-
tionally, when policies such as OTOP, rural tourism, and
organic rice arose as opportunities, these organizations were
well placed to help local residents leverage them. All three
potentially helpful initiatives contain pitfalls for would-be par-
ticipants. How do small-scale farmers deal with larger and
more powerful international players? How do they overcome
collective action problems? How do they establish the ﬁnancial
and social resources to take advantage of these opportunities?
How do they develop the myriad skills needed to pull oﬀ these
programs? These local social organizations, we suggest, helped
local people to respond well to these challenges.
Moreover, despite the fact that Thailand is a unitary state,
local provincial leaders also appeared to have played impor-
tant roles. While Si-Saket governors changed frequently over
this period, Surin enjoyed sustained leadership under Gover-
nor Kasemsak. Because Kasemsak enjoyed an especially long
tenure as governor and because he was able to work with such
a dense network of committed partners in civil society, he was
able to implement innovative approaches to achieving
national policy goals, such as promoting organic rice. The
provincial leadership would likely have been insuﬃcient with-
out the strong local capacity, and the network of farmers and
NGOs would likely have garnered much less success without a
stable, invested partner in the provincial capital.
Local leadership, national policies, and strong civil society
appear to have worked together to ensure that organic rice,
OTOP, and tourism led to increased farm and nonfarm
income suﬃcient to reduce poverty greatly. Collectively, these
three economic activities form an approach to economic devel-
opment and poverty reduction that is signiﬁcant for other rea-
sons as well. First, as noted in Figure 2, this approach allowed
farmers to remain at home, breaking the double-edge sword
that migrating to Bangkok or other major cities has become.
It allowed development to stay local and reduced the incentive
for the most capable people to leave the area. Locals usually
enjoy the beneﬁts of far more social capital when they stay
at home. By taking advantages of additional economic oppor-
tunities in the local economy, farmers are able to maintain
their social ties and avoid the abuse and exploitation that
non-skilled laborers sometimes experience when they migrate
out of their local communities. Second, the evidence here sug-
gests that Surin pursued a markedly diﬀerent approach to
development than that prescribed by advocates of GDP-
measured growth, driven by technological modernization
and large-scale industrialization. Surin focused not on high-
tech large-scale growth generators. Rather, the province
focused on stimulating low-tech small-scale opportunities of
which poorly educated farmers could take advantage. This
ensured that the economic growth generated would directly
beneﬁt poor farmers. No trickle down was necessary.
Thus, based on the evidence regarding Surin’s developmen-
tal approach, Surin provides an example of poverty reduction
that allows us to transcend the question of whether economic
growth is inevitably good for the poor. Growth certainly con-
tributed. Yet, this very contribution leads naturally to a more
important question: what kind of growth most directly bene-
ﬁts poor farmers? Here, Surin provides an answer both star-
tling and obvious. To reduce poverty, social and political
forces are needed to shift policies in ways that generate
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economic opportunities of a kind that poor people can take
advantage of. These opportunities do not have to be the three
sectors we analyzed here, but should be sectors that are rele-
vant to the particular area. In any case, the pursuit of these
‘‘micro-oriented” approaches is a big step away from the pre-
scriptions of those who advocate ‘‘growth at all costs,” or pro-
mote development through scaling up production and
promoting high-tech industries. At the same time, justifying
a policy prescription on the basis of one case is unwise —
much more research needs to be done before these notions
can become policy prescriptions.
In many respects, Surin’s micro-oriented state reﬂects the
thinking of Manfred Max-Neef, Michael Lipton, Paul Stree-
ten, Robert Chambers, and others who focus on basic human
needs approaches that avoid large-scale developmental
approaches. The spirit of this approach has also captured pop-
ular imagination through works such as Schumacher’s (1973)
classic book, Small Is Beautiful. These scholars discuss issues
of scale and technology as they focus on human-centered
development. Our research in Thailand illuminates an addi-
tional example of this ‘‘micro-oriented” approach. Through
an inductive process, we develop observable implications
about both the positive impacts that smaller scale, lower tech-
nology opportunities can have on the poor, and also how such
an approach to development can emerge. By doing so, we sub-
stantiate and ﬂesh out some of the ideas that have emerged
from this previous scholarship. Examples of this approach
can be found in a variety of places around the world, such
as a province in Southwest China that experienced rapid pov-
erty reduction despite moribund growth (Donaldson, 2011),
overlooked cottage industries in Singapore (Sullivan, 1985),
small-scale businesses in Taiwan and Hong Kong (e.g.,
Castells, 1992), and even in a struggling Chicago neighbor-
hood (Obama, 1995).
In Surin and in these other examples around the world,
small-scale and low-tech production appears to have created
the conditions under which the poor could reduce the poverty
that plagued them for decades. Social organizations and sub-
sequently local political support, our evidence suggests,
strengthened the structures needed for low-income residents
to take advantage of opportunities provided by the local envi-
ronment, changing social interests, and central government
policies. The resulting bottom-up, rather than trickle down,
growth could have contributed to a virtuous cycle that focused
the beneﬁts of economic growth on the poor.
NOTES
1. With regard to demographics, we refer to demographic features such
as population densities, levels of education, degrees of urbanization, etc.
Surin and Si-Saket’s populations are comparable, with Si-Saket’s popu-
lation about 6% higher than Surin’s, and its areas less than 9% larger.
2. Take geographic distance from major growth centers, for example.
Surin (250 km) is not signiﬁcantly closer to the major regional city of
Khon Kaen than is Si-Saket (268 km). Though the fact that Surin is one
province closer to Bangkok (433 km versus 538 km) may have helped
contribute to its overall success, other provinces in the Isan region that
are closer to Bangkok did not experience Surin’s rapid decline in poverty
rates. For instance, both Buriam and Nakhon Ratchasima saw more
than 70% lower rates of poverty reduction compared to Surin’s, despite
the fact that both provinces’ GDP increased 9% and 53% faster than
Surin’s during 2000–10, respectively. Surin’s proximity to markets in
Bangkok, Khon Kaen, and elsewhere was probably necessary to support
its tourism, organic rice, and OTOP industries. Given that other
provinces as closer or closer to these markets did not show the same
level of poverty reduction, however, indicates that proximity to Bangkok
was not suﬃcient.
3. The poverty gap is a measure of poverty’s severity. In 2002, for
instance, the poverty gap for Surin was 11.5, while Si-Saket’s rural poverty
gap stood at 5.3 (National Statistics Oﬃce., n.d.-a, n.d.-b).
4. Organic agriculture and tourism were not emphasized on the national
agenda in the same way as the other policies were. The central government
was not hostile to these initiatives, however. Moreover, with the success of
organic agriculture in Surin and a few other places, the Thaksin
Administration considered making these more of a national priority,
though it never was emphasized in the same way these other policies were.
5. Abbot Nan had pursued a development agenda since the 1950s,
inspiring monks to use temple resources to strengthen community and
ﬁght poverty at the village level across Surin. For more, see Phitthaya
(1994).
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